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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
not been determined against him and that he was entitled to a hearing.
This suggests that, setting aside the problem of abuse of remedy,'i to be
entitled to a hearing, a habeas corpus applicant need only assert new
facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief." By clarifying the word
"ground," the present case seems to have refined the guidelines establish-
ed in Sanders.
THoMAs J. DoNovAN
Torts-STRICT LIABILITY AND THE HOME CONTRAcToR-Krzegler v.
Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969)
In 1957 plaintiff purchased a home that had been constructed by the
defendant in 1951. In 1959 the radiant heating system that had been m-
stalled during the home's construction failed, resulting in property
damage. Recovery was sought from the defendant on the theory of
strict liability 1
The trial court held that regardless of negligence, defendant was
liable on the theory of strict liability because the heating system was
defective when installed.2 The court of appeals affirmed and held,
inter alia, that the doctrine of strict liability in tort would be applied for
the first time in California to sales of real estate.'
The traditional defense to an action for damages arising after the sale
of realty has been caveat emptor.4 Although it has lost much of its force
m the area of chattels5 it has persisted in the area of realty Two reasons
for this persistence have been advanced: 1) the purchaser has the
opportunity to inspect the premises for defects, and if he desires further
21. In the instant case the government did not plead abuse of remedy, so the court
under the doctrine of Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948), could not deny a hearing
on this basis. It has been suggested that in order for a court to deny a hearing on
the basis of abuse of remedy such abuse must have been the result of a deliberate
decision based on an improper motive. Pollak, The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77
HARV. L. REv. 62, 143 (1963). Hearings have been denied prisoners on the basis of
abuse of remedy. E.g., Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924); Jones v.
Montana, 232 F Supp. 771 (D. Mont. 1964).
22. If the facts are identical, a hearing may be denied. A recent second circuit
decision reversed, on an appeal by the New York Attorney General, a District Court's
granting of a hearing on a second habeas corpus application on the ground that the
facts were identical and had previously been deterrmned against the petitioner on the
merits. Schrntzler v. Follette, 406 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1969).
1. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc, 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 4 S. WmiusroN, CoTrracrs § 926 (rev. ed. 1936).
5. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, 315.
[Vol. 11.261
CURRENT DECISIONS
protection, can bargain to have express warranties inserted in the
deed;6 2) it is difficult in sales of realty to determine exactly what
quality the seller should be held to impliedly warrant.7 The modem
trend of decisions, however, has been to find home contractors liable
when they are also the vendor. The theories of liability asserted have
been implied warranty," negligence in the construction,' and tort liabil-
ity where an unreasonable risk to persons existing in the realty has not
been disclosed to the vendor.' 0 In Kriegler, however, the court used
none of the above theories and, while making no mention of caveat
emptor," held the contractor strictly liable.'2
6. See Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961); Coutrakor;
v. Adams, 39 IMI. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963), aff'd on rehearing, 31 Ill. 2d 189,
201 N.E.2d 100 (1964); Combow v. Kansas City Ground Inv. Co., 358 Mo. 934, 218
S.W.2d 539 (1949); Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales in Realty-Recent Assaults Upon
the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961).
7. See Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961); Dennison
v. Harden, 29 Wash. 2d 243, 186 P.2d 908 (1947); W PROSSER, TORTS 408 (3rd ed.
1964).
8. Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 154 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1967). While the
plaintiffs could not recover under the theories of negligence or fraud and deceit, the
vendor-builder was held liable to the purchaser for a breach of implied warranty of
reasonable workmanship and habitability. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.
1968) The vendor-builder was held liable for damages under an implied warranty
that the home was constructed in good workmanlike manner and was suitable for
human habitation. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314
(1965).
9. Rogers v. Scyphers, 161 S.E.2d 81 (S.C. 1968). The vendor-builder was held
liable to the purchaser for personal injuries sustained as a result of defective construc-
tion caused by the builder's negligence.
10. Id., REsTATEmEm (SEconD) OF TORTS § 353 (1965).
11. Although the court made no mention of caveat emptor, it relied heavily on the
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J.
70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965), where the court dismissed the maxim as a defense to the
action. The New Jersey court felt that an application of caveat emptor would dis-
regard the realities of the situation. It further stated:
Caveat emptor developed when the buyer and seller were in an equal
bargaining position and they could readily be expected to protect them-
selves in the deed. Buyers of mass produced development homes are
not on an equal footing with the builder vendors and are no more able to
protect themselves in the deed than are automobile purchasers in a
position to protect themselves in the bill of sale.
id. at -, 207 A.2d at 326.
12. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969)
The doctrine has been developed in California by Justice Traynor. See Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (concurring opinion).
The concurring opinion became the opinion of the court in Greenman v. Yuba Power-
Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
1969]
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As established in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.18 in proving
strict liability, the plaintiff need only show that the manufacturer has
placed a defective product on the market and that his injury was due
to the defect. The court stated that:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection
for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being.14
The court relied on Greenman and Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.15
in applying strict liability for the first time to sales of real estate. The
court noted that the plaintiff must prove that he was injured as a re-
sult of a defect in design and manufacture of which he was not aware
that made the instrumentality unsafe for its intended use, and that he
was injured while using the instrumentality in a way it was intended
to be used. It was further pointed out that the reasoning behind the
doctrine applied to any case of injury resulting from the risk-creating
,conduct of a seller m any stage of the production and distribution of
-goods."'
In Kriegler, the doctrine of strict liability in tort received its most ad-
13. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
14. Such liability for defective products is "stict, in the sense that it is un-
-necessary to prove the defendant's negligence and since the liability is in tort, the
defendant cannot avail himself of the usual contract or warranty defenses which might
be available in an action for breach of warranty. The purpose of imposing such strict
liability was said to be to insure that the cost of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers who put such products on the market, rather
,that by the injured persons, who are powerless to protect themselves. See Santor v.
A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) in a case dealing with
the manufacturing of defective carpeting in which the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated:
Under the strict liability in tort doctrine, as in the case of express or
implied warranty of fitness or merchantability, proof of the manufac-
turer's negligence in the making or handling of the article is not re-
quired. If the article is defective, i.e., not reasonably fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such articles are sold and used, and the defect arose
out of the design or manufacture or while the article was in the control
of the manufacturer, and it proximately causes injury or damage to the
ultimate purchaser or reasonably expected consumer, liability exists.
Id. at -, 207 A.2d at 313.
See also Henmngsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), one
of the nation's leading cases in the products liability field.
15. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
16. Barth v. B.F Goodrich Tire Co, 265 Cal. App. 2d 253, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968).
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vanced development 17 By holding the contractor liable, the court has,
in effect, made the home purchaser an equal to the chattel purchaser in
the field of vendee's protection. In so doing, the court noted that there
was no meaningful distinction between the mass production and sale of
automobiles and homes, and that the pertinent overriding policy con-
siderations were the same. The court felt that the public interest dictated'
this result and that the ancient legal distinctions that make no sense mi
today's society should be discarded in the law's growth to meet the
changing needs and mores of our contemporary world.'8
ANTHONY GAETA, JR.
Constitutional Law-RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH- Tinker v. Indepen-
dent Comnunity School District, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969).
Plaintiffs, minor school children, sought to enjoin local school authon-
ties from enforcement of a regulation prohibiting the wearing on school
premises of black armbands in protest of the war in Viet Nam.' The
district court dismissed the complaint, thus upholding the action of the
school authorities, 2 and a divided court of appeals affirmed.3 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari 4 to consider the question of whether
or not the action of the school authority in this case was a permissible
limitation of the right of free speech guaranteed to citizens of states by
the first and fourteenth amendments.
The Supreme Court, following the holding of the Fifth Circuit in
Burnside v. Byars,5 held that for the school authority to justify the
abridgment of the right to free speech, 6 school officials must be able to
17. The court cited Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc, 44 NJ. 70, 207 A2d 314 (1965)
as authority for its decision. In Schipper, the court held that the builder-vendor was
liable to the purchaser on the basis of strict liability for personal injury. In Kriegler,
the damage was to property. See 51 CoRNF, LL, L. Q. 389 (1966); 41 WASH. L. Rxv. 166
(1966).
18. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
1. 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). The ages of the children ranged from thirteen to sixteen;.
their protest was part of an organized group including both adults and children.
2. 258 F Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
3. 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
4. 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
5. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
6. Id. at 748:
[School officials] cannot infringe upon their students' right to free and
unrestricted expression as guaranteed them under the First Amendment
where the exercise of such rights in the school buildings and school rooms
1969]
